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Abstract 
Many important decisions hinge on expectations of future outcomes. Decisions about health, 
investments, and relationships all depend on one’s view of the future. Importantly, these 
expectations are often optimistic: People frequently believe preferred outcomes are more likely 
than is merited. Yet it is unclear whether optimism persists with experience and, surprisingly, 
whether it is truly caused by desire. These are important questions because life’s most 
consequential decisions often feature both strong preferences and the opportunity to learn. We 
investigated these questions by collecting NFL football predictions from NFL fans during each 
week of the 2008 season. Despite accuracy incentives and extensive feedback, predictions about 
preferred teams remained optimistically biased through the entire season. Optimism was as 
strong after four months as after four weeks. We exploit variation in preferences and matchups to 
show that desirability fuels this optimistic bias. 
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Hope Over Experience: Desirability and the Persistence of Optimism 
 
Samuel Johnson famously proclaimed that a second marriage reflects “the triumph of hope 
over experience" (Boswell, 1791). Researchers have amply documented the apparent triumph of 
hope: People are excessively optimistic about marriage (Baker & Emery, 1993), work (Hoch, 
1985), sports (Radzevick & Moore, 2008), health (Weinstein, 1980) and life expectancy (Puri & 
Robinson, 2007). Yet, it remains unclear whether (1) hope triumphs over experience – do people 
persist in making optimistic judgments as they acquire feedback? – and, surprisingly, (2) whether 
optimism is actually caused by hope. Investigating these questions together is important, as many 
of life’s most consequential decisions (e.g., about health, investments, relationships) feature both 
strong preferences and the chance to revise one’s beliefs in light of new information (e.g., 
medical exams, balance statements, previous dates). 
Does Optimism Persist? 
Does optimism persist as people acquire feedback about a desired outcome’s likelihood and 
about the accuracy of prior predictions? According to rational theories of belief revision, 
ignorance enables optimistic biases and, thus, ample feedback should eventually eliminate them 
(List, 2003). Indeed, researchers in both economics (Coursey, Hovis, & Schulze, 1987; Fraser & 
Greene, 2006) and psychology (Colvin & Block, 1994) have argued that the ability to learn from 
experience means that judgmental biases are less important than they might otherwise appear. 
However, other theories predict that optimistic biases will persist in the face of feedback. 
Kahneman and Lovallo’s (1993) discussion of inside and outside views suggests that people 
often fail to apply the lessons of past experience to the particulars of a specific case (Buehler, 
Griffin, & Ross, 1994). Research on selective attention (Hart et al., 2009) suggests that people 
attend more to feedback when predictions are confirmed rather than disconfirmed. And research 
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on motivated reasoning suggests that people may distort the implications of information they 
receive (Kunda, 1990) or convince themselves that their predictions were “almost right” 
(Tetlock, 1998).  
It is possible that both camps are (at least partially) correct. We suggest that predictions about 
desirable outcomes improve with experience but remain optimistically biased nevertheless. This 
is because prediction accuracy is a function of both bias (e.g., how much people overestimate the 
likelihood of desirable events) and discrimination (how closely predictions correlate with 
objective outcomes) (Yaniv, Yates, & Smith, 1991). Importantly, bias and discrimination are 
independent. Consider, for example, two weather forecasters in New Haven, Connecticut. One 
predicts the next day’s temperature to be 50o Fahrenheit every day of the year. She is unbiased, 
because New Haven’s average temperature is in fact 50o. But her predictions also show no 
discrimination – the correlation between her predictions and actual temperatures is zero. The 
second forecaster’s predictions show good discrimination, properly distinguishing warmer days 
from colder ones, but average 60o, and so are biased. Thus, the accuracy of one’s predictions, as 
measured by their correlation with actual outcomes, can improve while remaining biased. 
It is not uncommon for predictions to be both biased and correlated with objective outcomes 
(e.g., Buehler, et al., 1994; Burson, Larrick, & Klayman, 2006). Notably, the rational updating 
hypothesis predicts that experience will improve discrimination and reduce bias, while the 
persistence hypothesis predicts only the persistence of bias. A more nuanced prediction, drawing 
from research on motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990) and self-predictions (Epley & Dunning, 
2006),  suggests that the information experience provides will allow people to (1) make more 
discriminating predictions, but also to (2) justify predictions that are biased in favor of their 
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preferences. In other words, experience may improve discrimination while leaving optimism 
intact. 
Does Desire Drive Optimism? 
Implicit in these hypotheses is the idea that desirability fuels optimistic predictions. But are 
optimistic biases actually driven by desire? After decades of research, this most elementary (and 
intuitively appealing) hypothesis—that preferences directly influence beliefs—has become a 
matter of some controversy. One reason for this is the paucity of research supporting the 
hypothesis. As highlighted in a recent review (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007), the few careful 
studies of the impact of desirability on optimism have largely produced null or weak findings. 
On this basis, Krizan and Windschitl concluded that “the empirical evidence for the desirability 
bias… is actually quite thin” (p. 228). Bar-Hillel and Budescu (1992; 2008) have similarly 
concluded that the desirability bias is “elusive.”  
We are reluctant to generalize from these findings because the desirability manipulations on 
which they are based (e.g., a $5 prize) simply may not have been large enough to induce the 
intensity of preference often experienced in consequential decisions. This is important, because 
strong preferences may produce optimistic biases even if weak preferences produce none. Our 
field-study approach is in line with recent research turning to “real world” settings associated 
with very strong preferences (e.g., presidential elections, Krizan, Miller, & Johar, 2010) in order 
to better evaluate the relation between desirability and optimistic biases.  
This Research 
To investigate our two main questions – whether optimism persists and whether it is 
influenced by desirability – we asked NFL football fans to predict game outcomes before each 
week of the 17-week NFL season. Studying football predictions offered many important benefits 
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over the very few studies previously considering experience and optimism (Buehler, et al., 1994; 
Radhakrishnan, Arrow, & Sniezek, 1996; Weinstein, 1987). First, the 17-week season provided 
participants with quick, frequent, and unambiguous feedback over a significant (and non-
arbitrary) duration of time, providing an ideal context for evaluating the impact of experience on 
optimism. Second, preferences in this domain are strong, and often held with a degree of 
intensity unlikely to be generated by incentives offered in the lab. Third, a number of alternative 
explanations for the effects of desirability, such as those implicating team strength and 
familiarity, can be controlled methodologically and statistically. Finally, unlike predictions in 
other emotionally important domains, football predictions offer the benefit of objective 
benchmarks – both ex ante and ex post – against which the accuracy of predictions can be 
evaluated.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
One week before the start of the 2008 NFL football season, we invited 902 NFL fans to 
complete weekly online surveys; 728 (81%) completed at least one survey. These fans were 
among those who had previously completed a survey indicating their favorite NFL team, 
allowing us to recruit relatively even numbers of fans of all 32 NFL teams. Each Wednesday of 
the season, participants received an e-mail containing a link to a survey asking them to predict 
the following week’s NFL games.1 Each survey awarded a $25 amazon.com gift card to a 
random participant and additional prizes for accurate predictions. 
Measures 
 Predictions. Every week participants predicted the winner and final point differential of each 
game. Each survey clearly explained the incentives for making accurate predictions. A 
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participant’s weekly earnings were determined by the across-game average absolute difference 
(AAD) between their predictions and the game outcomes, using the formula: $3.50 – ($.25 * 
AAD). Negative earnings did not cost our participants anything, and they knew this. The weekly 
and cumulative earnings of all participants were posted on a website devoted to the study 
(participants were identified using an id they chose in the first week), and they were paid in 
amazon.com gift cards at the end of the season. As an additional incentive, each week’s best 
performer earned a $50 amazon.com gift card, delivered immediately, and the website 
announced and congratulated these weekly winners.2 
Normative benchmarks. We used two normative benchmarks for participant predictions: the 
actual outcome (point difference) and the point spread. The point spread reflects a game’s 
expected point difference, as determined by professional bookmakers. This measure is unbiased 
(Simmons & Nelson, 2006), and thus provides an unusually ideal standard of rational 
expectations. 
Team quality. We assessed team quality using two measures: (1) the team’s winning 
percentage through the previous week’s games, and (2) the probability that the team would make 
the Super Bowl, as estimated by the market prices for Super Bowl tickets at yoonew.com. 
Yoonew is a web-based service that sells tickets to future sporting events if a specific team 
participates in the event. Prices fluctuate depending on the likelihood a team will make the event 
(i.e., prices for good teams are higher than prices for bad teams). Using price data provided by 
the company, we inferred the market probability of each team making the Super Bowl at every 
point during the season. The prices are well-behaved, with the aggregate probabilities summing 
appropriately to 200% throughout the season. These probabilities provide a more continuous 
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measure of team quality than do won-loss records – especially early in the season – and arguably 
a more informed one (Chen, Ingersoll Jr, & Kaplan, 2008). 
Team preferences. We assessed participants’ preferences for teams in two ways. Prior to the 
start of the season, participants completed a survey indicating which team was their favorite, and 
also rated how much they liked each team (1 = very strongly dislike; 9 = very strongly like). 
Team familiarity. We also assessed participants’ familiarity with teams in two ways. Prior to 
the start of the season, participants completed a survey indicating how much they knew about 
each team (1 = nothing; 5 = almost everything). Additionally, each week of the season they 
reported how much of each game they watched the previous week, with the response options: 
None, Just Highlights, Less Than 1 Quarter, Up To 2 Quarters, Up to 3 Quarters, More Than 3 
Quarters.  
 Win desirability. We randomly assigned half the sample to rate how much they wanted their 
favorite team to win their next game (0 = I do not care whether my favorite team wins or loses; 
10 = I desperately want my favorite team to win). These ratings were obtained weekly, after 
predictions were made. We asked this of only half of the participants because we were concerned 
that asking this question might affect optimism; it did not.  
 Demographics. Our first survey collected standard demographic information and a variety of 
measures to assess NFL “fandom” (see Table 1). 
Results 
Sample Characteristics 
Seven hundred twenty-eight participants completed the pre-season survey and at least one 
week’s predictions. Of these, 386 (53%) completed at least 14 of the 17 weekly surveys, our ex 
ante inclusion rule. This sample (45% female, Mage = 35) was diverse in its rooting interests (the 
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median team was the favorite team of 22 participants) and passionate about NFL football (the 
median participant reported watching 3 games each week). Importantly, our final sample was 
virtually identical to those who were dropped (see Table 1). Across many measures, the only 
reliable difference was how closely they reported following the NFL, t(665) = 3.14, p < .01.  
 Optimism and Experience  
 We first investigated whether fans made optimistic predictions, and, if so, whether optimism 
persisted with experience. We analyzed participants’ predictions each week of the season, 
estimating how often they predicted their favorite team to win and how often they predicted 
other teams to win.  As shown in Figure 1, participants predicted their favorite team to win more 
than 60% of the time every week of the season, while predicting all other teams to win 
approximately 50% of the time.3 This optimistic bias was highest (77%) the first week of the 
season. The bias drifted to a low of 63% in midseason before increasing to approximately 70% at 
the end of the season. The bias was reliably positive in every week (all ps < .01).  
 So it is clear that optimism persists, but is there any evidence of learning?  To investigate 
this, we analyzed a second measure of accuracy (discrimination) – the correlation between 
predicted and actual outcomes. As shown in Figure 2, this correlation improved systematically 
over the course of the season for games involving favorite teams, but not for games involving 
non-favorite teams. To formally test this pattern we regressed predicted outcome on actual 
outcome, week (centered), favorite team (a dummy variable for games involving the participant’s 
favorite team), as well as all two-way interactions and the three-way interaction. We found a 
reliable three-way interaction, β = .02, z = 2.43, p < .05, indicating that the correlation between 
predicted and actual outcomes improved more over the course of the season for games involving 
favorite teams than those involving non-favorite teams. 
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This analysis of discrimination and experience reveals that participants were learning. 
Moreover, learning operated in the way rational models would predict – it was strongest for the 
teams participants paid the most attention to, their favorites. Interestingly, this stands in stark 
contrast to the analysis showing that optimism persisted in the face of 4 months of experience. 
This combination – persistent bias and improved discrimination – parallels Epley and Dunning’s 
(2006) work on the “mixed blessing of self-knowledge.” They found that predictions about the 
self show better discrimination and more bias than predictions about others. This occurs because 
although self-knowledge – like experience – provides information allowing improved 
discrimination, this same information can be used to justify desirable conclusions.  
Optimism and Desirability 
Although we have shown that optimism persisted for 17 weeks, we have not yet uncovered 
whether desirability was driving optimism. In this section, we report four distinct tests of this 
hypothesis.   
Our empirical strategy is the same throughout this section. Each test regresses predicted 
outcomes on some measure of desirability. We use probit maximum likelihood regression since 
predicted outcomes are binary (win/lose).4 Except for the first baseline test, all models included 
the same set of control variables: two normative benchmarks (point spread and actual outcome), 
two measures of team quality (winning percentage and the market probability of making the 
Super Bowl) and two measures of familiarity with the team (pre-season knowledge ratings and 
weekly TV exposure). The models also included team fixed-effects and an indicator for which is 
the home team. We standardized all continuous variables. Observations were participant-games, 
with standard errors clustered on participant. We dropped Week 1 from the analyses in order to 
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accommodate lagged variables (e.g., TV viewing). We report results in terms of the change in 
the probability of predicting a team will win due to a one-unit change in the variable of interest.  
We first tested desirability bias using participants’ favorite team. The baseline model – 
simply the unconditional relation between predicted outcomes and favorite teams – showed that 
the favorite bias was reliably positive, β = 0.188, z(385) = 11.8, p < .01. This means that 
participants were 19% more likely to predict a team would win the game when that team was 
their favorite. This comports with the analysis in the previous section showing the mean 
likelihood of predicting favorite teams would win ranged from 63% to 77% over the course of 
the season. This effect is still significant, and in fact only slightly reduced, after adding our full 
array of control variables, β = 0.164, z(385) = 10.1, p < .01. That optimistic bias was robust even 
after controlling for team strength indicates that the biasing effect of desirability was not a 
simple artifact of fans favoring good teams (cf. Radzevick & Moore, 2008).  Similarly, our 
controls for team familiarity indicate that optimism is uniquely related to the desirability of a 
team, and not merely to fans’ greater familiarity with their favorites (cf. Kilka & Weber, 2000).   
Next we dropped the favorite-team designation, using instead the pre-season liking ratings 
participants assigned to each team along with our full set of controls. This generalized our test of 
desirability beyond a single team for each participant. Results were consistent with the 
desirability hypothesis, showing that predictions were strongly positively related to team liking, 
β = .0419, z(385) = 12.7, p < .01. 
A weakness of the liking ratings is that they were constant throughout the season and thus 
confounded with other participant-team factors (e.g., history). In contrast, the desirability ratings 
we collected each week from half the sample varied within season, providing a very different 
source of variation in desirability. Using these desirability ratings instead of the favorite team 
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measure or liking ratings, we again found a strongly positive relation between desirability and 
predicted outcomes, β = .0504, z(385) = 3.29, p < .01. This relation is particularly important 
because it shows that optimistic biases vary with desirability even among a team’s strongest fans.  
So far we have reported evidence of desirability bias using three different measures of 
desirability – favorite team, liking ratings, and week-to-week ratings of desirability – while 
including extensive controls for alternative explanations. As a final test of desirability bias we 
moved from investigating the impact of desirability to the impact of ambiguity, a necessary 
condition for motivated construal (Kunda, 1990; Marks, 1951; McGregor, 1938). We used the 
absolute value of the point spread as a measure of the ambiguity of evidence about the game’s 
outcome, (Buckley & Sniezek, 1992). Large positive and large negative point spreads indicate 
very little doubt about which team will win. Conversely, point spreads close to zero indicate 
significant ambiguity. This leads to the hypothesis that predictions about favorite team 
performance will be most positively biased for games expected to be relatively close. That is, 
bias should be negatively related to the absolute point spread for predictions about favorites but 
not for non-favorites.  
We tested this by adding the absolute point spread to the prediction model detailed above, as 
well as the interaction between the absolute point spread and favorite team. There was no main 
effect of absolute point spread, β = -.0004, z(385) = 0.13, ns. The main effect of favorite team 
was significant and very similar in size to previous models, β= .156, z(385) = 9.34, p < .01. 
Critically, there was a significant interaction between the absolute point spread and favorite 
team, β =- .048, z(385) = -3.69, p < .01.  We depict this interaction in Figure 3 by plotting the 
predicted probability of winning against the objective ex ante probability of winning, as 
determined by the point spread.5 As always, the standard by which we measured optimistic bias 
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was the predictions about non-favorite teams, which are shown to be unbiased.6  Predictions 
about favorite teams are positively biased over the entire range of objective probabilities. 
Consistent with the desirability hypothesis, the bias is largest when the outcome is most 
ambiguous, peaking near the midpoint, when a favorite team has approximately a 50% chance of 
winning the game.  
Figure 3 provides an apt summary of the overall pattern we observe. Most notable is the size 
and ubiquity of the distortion in the predictions made by fans with vested interests – through 
much of the range the optimistic bias is at or beyond 20%! In the eyes of those who desire them, 
relatively unlikely events, such as teams winning when neutral fans pick them only 30% of the 
time, become 50/50 propositions. 50% events become the quite likely 70%. And 70% events 
become an almost certain 90%. 
Discussion 
Understanding the role of optimistic biases in consequential and emotional domains such 
as health, relationships, and investments requires studying judgment in circumstances in which 
passions are strong. Our study of football fans’ predictions met this requirement. We found that 
people are optimistic in their predictions – they judge preferred outcomes to be more likely. We 
extend this observation in two ways that are important for a deeper understanding of optimism. 
First, we show that optimism persists in the face of extensive experience – football fans are as 
optimistic after 4 months of feedback as they are after 4 weeks. Second, we find strong evidence 
of the elusive desirability bias. Using four distinct tests, we find that optimistic predictions are 
related to the desirability of the outcome. Overall, we show that experience provides the same 
kind of “mixed blessing” as self-knowledge: Optimistically biased judgments persist even while 
calibration improves. 
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We do not purport to show that people cannot learn away their optimistic biases. It is 
possible that optimistic biases would diminish if given feedback in an even more explicit 
manner. Rather, our interest is whether people learn when they acquire feedback naturally. We 
show that in an ecologically valid setting that is in many ways a “best case” for learning from 
experience (e.g., it includes feedback that is extensive, frequent, precise, and objective), 
optimistic biases persist. 
 But do participants really believe the predictions they make (Williams & Gilovich, 2008)? 
Might they, due perhaps to a sense of loyalty, predict better outcomes for their favorite teams 
than they actually believe? This is of course the point of providing incentives for accurate 
predictions. It is also the point of testing for desirability in widely varying ways. For example, it 
would require a particularly complicated form of loyalty to produce a bias that applies not only 
to favorite teams but also to those merely well liked, varies over the course of the season 
depending on the desirability of a win, and does not apply when a favorite team is either very 
likely, or very unlikely, to win the game. In contrast, all of these results flow directly and 
parsimoniously from the desirability hypothesis. 
It is unclear whether this kind of optimistic bias is rational. Any benefits from the hope we 
observe must be set against the risk of disappointment when those hopes are not realized 
(Brickman, Coates, & Janoff-Bulman, 1978; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997). Does the 
tendency to make this trade-off reflect the “calculus of optimism” (Brown & Dutton, 1995)?  An 
“optimal margin of illusion” (Baumeister, 1989)? These important questions remain 
controversial. We hope this demonstration of the nature of optimism, and its robustness, can 
inform the rationality debate. Our findings show that optimism is not the product of ignorance or 
 Hope Over Experience 15 
 
inattention. Though perhaps more of a truce than a triumph, hope appears as fueled by 
experience as it is sobered by it. 
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Footnotes 
1. They could submit their predictions until one hour before the survey’s first game began. 
Although most NFL football games are played on Sundays and Mondays, a few are played 
on Thursdays and Saturdays. To give participants enough time to register their predictions 
before the games began, we asked them “only” to predict the 246 (out of 256) games played 
on Sundays and Mondays.  
2. While this first-place incentive might induce risk-taking in predictions, there is no normative 
reason why this should interact with preferences. 
3. Participants’ favorite teams actually won exactly 50% of their games. 
4. Every result in this paper is also reliable when tested using a more continuous dependent 
variable, predicted point difference. Comprehensive regression results are available from the 
authors. 
5. We estimate the objective probability of winning given a particular point spread using 
logistic regression, based on the point spreads and outcomes of all NFL games, 1978-2009 
(n=7,406).  
6. Importantly, using this standard ensures that we do not attribute to optimism what is merely 
due to regressive predictions (Burson, et al., 2006; Moore & Healy, 2008). 
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Table 1 
Sample Characteristics and Attrition Analysis 
Characteristic Included Dropped All 
N 386 342 728 
% Male 56%a 54%a 55% 
Age 35.4a 34.0a 34.8 
Jerseys owned 1.94a 2.04a 1.98 
Follow NFL closely (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely) 3.95a 3.71b 3.85 
Games watched per week 3.81a 4.22a 3.98 
% in a fantasy league 38%a 32%a 35% 
Win % of favorite team 50%a 51%a 50% 
Probability of predicting favorite team will win 69%a 70%a 69% 
 
Note. Means and percentages with different subscripts are significant at p < .05.  
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Figure 1. Optimistic bias over time. Percent of time participants picked a team to win a game. 
Shown are means for each week, split by whether or not a team was the participant’s favorite.  
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Figure 2. Prediction-outcome correlation over time. The correlation between the participants’ 
predicted winners and the actual winners, for each week of the season. Lines are linear fits. 
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Figure 3. Optimistic bias and ambiguity. The probability a participant predicted their favorite 
team to win, as a function of the objective ex ante probability the team would win, based on the 
point spread.  
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